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Beyts v Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd: Caught Short on Data 
Protection and Privacy 
 
Small claims1 in the sheriff court do not often fire the imagination of the national press, and Ms 
Beyts herself seems previously to have figured in the local newspapers only to the extent of small 
print on charity swims2 and an award-winning photograph of nacreous clouds over rural 
Aberdeenshire.3  In April this year the defenders’ presidential associations in Beyts v Trump 
International Golf Club Scotland Ltd4 bucked this trend, sending Ms Beyts’ name down the 
newswires from Catterline to Yekaterinburg. A regrettable omission from that press 
extravaganza, however, was proper discussion of the intriguing legal issues which this case raised.  
 
A. THE FACTS 
 
Whether or not Ms Beyts would subscribe to the accolade of “environment activist” awarded to 
her by The Guardian,5  she was one of the group of individuals in the local community who had 
opposed the defenders’ golf resort development on the Aberdeenshire coast at Menie. On the 
day in question she and a friend had used a public right of access across the golf course on their 
way to the beach, pausing, however, to take a photograph of a flagpole that was the subject of a 
disputed planning application. In doing so they were noticed by a Trump employee, who, along 
with two colleagues (all men), drove on to the course to observe the pursuer and her friend. 
Meanwhile the pursuer, who was affected by a medical condition, felt an urgent need to answer a 
call of nature and she found for this purpose a spot in the sand dunes which she believed was 
secluded. She was unaware that 230 metres away she was being watched by the three Trump 
employees, one of whom used his mobile phone to take a picture of her urinating, and thereafter 
reported the incident to the police. The first intimation that the pursuer received of this6 was at 
10 pm that evening when two police officers arrived at her home and charged her with a 
contravention of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, section 47, which provides that 
“any person who urinates…in such circumstances as to cause, or to be likely to cause, annoyance 
                                                          
1 Now replaced by Simple Procedure (Act of Sederunt (Simple Procedure) 2016, SSI 2016/200).  
2 See http://www.scotsman.com/news/social-worker-to-take-a-spin-in-the-corryvreckan-for-charity-1-1559545 
3 See http://rmets-scotland.weebly.com/paton-competition.html 
4 [2017] SC EDIN 21; 2017 GWD 12-187. 
5 The Guardian, 3 April 2017. 
6 Recounted in a Facebook post at https://en-gb.facebook.com/rohan.beyts/posts/10154739584267786 .  
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to any other person shall be guilty of an offence”. Criminal proceedings were never brought, and 
instead the pursuer raised an action against the defenders based upon the defenders’ breach of 
the Data Protection Act 1998. As narrated by Sheriff Donald Corke, the injury that she had 
suffered was constituted by distress about: (i) the circumstances of being charged with a criminal 
offence (ii) the fact that men had watched her urinating; and (iii) the fact of being photographed 
in this act. 
 
B. APPLICATION OF THE DATA PROTECTION ACT 1998 
 
It was uncontroversial that the digital photograph taken by the Trump employee was personal 
data and that the defenders were the data controller in terms of the Data Protection Act 1998, 
section 1. The defenders had not, however, registered as such, as required by section 17 of the 
Act, which section 21 states to be an offence. Ms Beyts therefore invoked section 13 which 
allows for damages to be awarded to individuals who suffer distress due to contravention of the 
Act. Reference was made also to the Court of Appeal decision in Vidal-Hall v Google Inc,7 which 
clarified that compensation could be awarded in terms of section 13 where the individual had 
suffered distress only, even if there was no other type of loss. However, the pursuer did not look 
beyond this to cite a breach of any of the eight data protection principles to which data 
controllers are bound to adhere as stated in section 4 and listed in Part I of Schedule 1 of the 
Act. The sheriff noted: “Her solicitor advocate was specific in stating that were it not for the 
failure to register, we would not have been here considering the case.”8 Thus the fatal gap in the 
pursuer’s argument as pled was the absence of a causal connection between the failure to register 
and the undoubtedly real distress which she experienced during this episode. The sheriff 
therefore had no option but to dismiss the claim.   
 
This conclusion meant that there was no need to consider the defence that the defenders 
would have put forward under section 29 of the 1998 Act, to the effect that the offending data 
was being processed for “the prevention or detection of crime” of “the apprehension or 
prosecution of offenders”. This defence would in any event have been “unattractive”9 given that 
in crossing the golf course the pursuer had been exercising an access right permissible in terms 
of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, and in finding a discreet place to urinate she had acted 
                                                          
7 [2015] EWCA Civ 311; [2016] QB 1003. 
8 At para 19. 
9 At para 21. 
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within the Scottish Outdoor Access Code 2005.10 The sheriff was not therefore impressed by the 
“defenders’ examples of men urinating in shop doorways or of shoplifters”.11 Indeed, despite the 
claim being dismissed, there was little doubt which party had the moral high ground. Although 
he would have assessed fair compensation at only £750, rather than the £3,000 sought by the 
pursuer, the sheriff was clear that “the pursuer should not have been photographed”, and he 
even went on to warn that “officious bystanders taking pictures of females urinating in the 
countryside put themselves at very real risk of prosecution, whether for a public order offence or 
voyeurism”. 12 At the same time, he remarked that “Both sides were represented and it was not 
for me to go looking for some different basis of the case which might have been arguable.”13 
 
It is not obvious why the pursuer did not invoke a breach of the data protection 
principles. Those who are data controllers within the meaning of section 1 of the 1998 Act are 
obviously not absolved of the obligation to adhere to the data protection principles simply by 
their failure to register in terms of section 17. As observed by Lord Hodge from the Privy 
Council in Baronetcy of Pringle of Stichill, where a party is deemed to have been a data controller 
under the 1998 Act, there is a requirement both that it should have registered and that it should 
have complied with the data protection principles.14 Although the pursuer apparently did not cite 
them, the sheriff himself noted the principles, as recently discussed in another sheriff court case, 
Woolley v Akram.15  In Woolley, significant compensation was awarded to the upstairs neighbours 
of a ground floor proprietor who had trained CCTV and audio recording devices on their 
property. This was found to be in breach of inter alia the first principle (processing to be fair and 
lawful) and the third principle (processing to be adequate, relevant and not excessive).  The 
circumstances were very different as between Woolley and Beyts, but the relevance of the first and 
third principle to the latter might usefully have been considered. It seems at least arguable that 
breach of those principles by the defenders did cause the distress of the type the pursuer suffered 
and might therefore have been actionable in terms of section 13.  
 
C. BREACH OF PRIVACY? 
                                                          
10 Made in terms of s 10 of the 2003 Act: see http://www.outdooraccess-scotland.com/ 
11 At para 21.  
12 At para 21. 
13 At para 20. 
14 [2016] UKPC 16; 2016 SC (PC) 1 at para 71. 




Several of the many newspaper accounts seized upon this case as dealing with “breach of 
privacy”, but in fact breach of privacy as a basis for delictual liability was neither pled nor 
discussed. This was perhaps a missed opportunity.  
Admittedly breach of privacy has hitherto seen very little litigation in the Scottish 
courts.16 For the last decade or more the English courts have had countless opportunities to 
develop the new tort born out of breach of confidence and Article 8 ECHR’s requirement to 
protect private life, and christened in Campbell v MGN as misuse of private information.17 Yet 
there has so far been no opportunity for a judicial pronouncement on whether the equivalent 
delict is recognised.18 That said, the wrong suffered by Ms Beyts could not properly be 
characterised as misuse of private information, since the offending photograph was deleted 
almost immediately, when the police told the phone’s owner that it was not needed as evidence 
of the suspected criminal offence. Moreover, the distress that she suffered related not to any use 
of the photograph, but to the fact of being photographed, and the knowledge that three men had 
watched her urinate.  In the famous scheme of privacy torts pioneered by the US scholar William 
Prosser, this was not disclosure of private facts but “intrusion”, as perpetrated by intruding upon 
“the plaintiff’s seclusion”.19 On the English side of the Atlantic privacy protection is much less 
certain in relation to this type of wrong. Although recognition of the rights enshrined in Article 8 
ECHR provided the impetus to establish a new tort of misuse of private information, Article 8 
has not thus far entered “into the very content”20 of the common law to the extent of creating a 
wider privacy tort encompassing privacy of personal space and privacy of the person.21 Yet 
Article 8 clearly does look beyond informational privacy to wider concerns of “physical and 
                                                          
16 See Stair’s comments (Inst 1.4.9) on the dearth of actions for verbal injury in Scotland as compared with in 
England. Three hundred years later the same can be said of breach of privacy. 
17 [2004] 2 AC 457 per Lord Nicholls at para 14. 
18 X v BBC 2005 SLT 796 did not go this far, and Response Handling v BBC 2008 SLT 51 turned upon breach of 
confidence. However, in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 25; 2014 SC (UKSC) 151 at paras 
46-48 Lord Reed appeared to indicate that Scots law would follow English law in this respect. 
19 “Privacy” (1960) 48 Cal L Rev 383 at 389-392. (The other three were public disclosure of embarrassing private 
facts, publicity placing the plaintiff in a false light, and appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.) See also 
American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B.   
20 McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73 per Buxton LJ at para 11 (describing Article 8’s impact upon misuse of private 
information). 
21 See in particular Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406 rejecting the suggestion that a general tort of invasion of 
privacy should be recognised. 
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psychological integrity” and to protection against intrusions upon the person as threatening “the 
most intimate aspect of one's private life”.22 Indeed judicial dicta acknowledging as much are 
beginning to appear in the English courts,23 and the standard textbook predicts that “further 
development in the common law of protection of physical privacy…seems likely”.24  But so far 
the obstacle has been that the courts must first “identify another cause of action to act as a peg 
on which any liability for non-informational breaches of privacy can be hung”.25 
 
Does Scots law place itself differently? For many years prior to 2004, there was a thriving 
academic literature on whether, in the face of the English refusal to admit such a tort, the more 
flexible superstructure of the Scots law of delict allowed for a wrong of breach of privacy in a 
general sense.26 That debate continues to fill the library shelves,27 and there is certainly 
Institutional authority to support delictual liability for injury to dignity as well as assaults upon 
the person or reputation,28 but recent case law has been as rare in these aspects of privacy as it is 
in its informational aspects. As Lord Bonomy memorably observed in Martin v McGuiness all that 
can be said for sure is that: “it does not follow that, because a specific right to privacy has not so 
far been recognised, such a right does not fall within existing principles of the law.”29  
 
                                                          
22 See YF v Turkey (2004) 39 EHRR 34 at para 33; see also C von Bar et al (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules 
of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (2008) providing not only that breach of confidence should be 
reparable (VI.-2:205), but also infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy (VI.-2:203(1).  
23 See, e.g., R v Broadcasting Standards Commission [2001] QB 885 per Lord Mustill at para 48: “An infringement of 
privacy is an affront to the personality, which is damaged both by the violation and by the demonstration that the 
personal space is not inviolate.”  See also R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2008] 1 AC 719 per Lord 
Bingham at para 11. 
24 N A Moreham and M Warby (eds), Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and The Media 3rd edn (2014) para 
10.98; see also N A Moreham, “Beyond information: physical privacy in English law” (2014) 73 CLJ 350. 
25 Moreham and Warby (n 23), para 10.93 (the “peg” for misuse of private information having been breach of 
confidence). 
26 See, e.g., Lord Kilbrandon, “The Law of Privacy in Scotland” (1971) 2 Cambrian Law Review 35; D M Walker, The 
Law of Delict in Scotland 2nd edn (1981) 703-708. 
27 See, e.g., N Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law (2009); E C Reid, Personality, 
Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (2010). 
28 See Bankton, Inst 1.10.21; Bell, Prin §§ 2028-2057 on the “absolute rights of individuals”. 
29 2003 SLT 1424 at para 28 (a case involving surveillance by a private detective, ultimately regarded as justified in 
the context of a personal injuries litigation.) 
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There have, however, been one or two cases in which “intrusion” upon the privacy of 
the person has been acknowledged as actionable, although the basis for delictual liability was not 
clearly articulated. In Henderson v Chief Constable, Fife Police30 a woman detainee was awarded 
solatium to compensate for the invasion of “privacy and liberty”31 suffered by being compelled 
to remove her bra while in police custody. Admittedly the Lord Ordinary, Lord Jauncey, could 
identify no “Scottish case in which it had been held that removal of clothing forcibly or by 
requirement could constitute a wrong”,32 but adopting a “broad axe” approach he reasoned that 
“since such removal must amount to an infringement of liberty I see no reason why the law 
should not protect the individual from this infringement”.33 In another case more directly in 
point, McKie v Chief Constable of Strathclyde,34 the pursuer claimed that the manner of her wrongful 
arrest and detention, constituted “an invasion of her privacy and liberty and an assault”.35 Her 
indignities included being watched while she urinated and showered, as well as undergoing an 
inappropriate strip search. The incident occurred before the ECHR was incorporated into 
domestic law and before direct action against public authorities was made possible by the 
Human Rights Act 1998, and the case failed because the pursuer could not prove malice, which 
actions against the police were thought to require.36 However, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Emslie, 
did concede that such wrongs could provide the basis for delictual liability:37  
 
the intimate watching of the pursuer as she prepared herself to leave the house [and] the intimate 
nature of the search carried out…could… conceivably be held, depending on how the evidence came 
out, to have gone well beyond what was necessary in the circumstances and to have amounted to 
assaults on the pursuer for the purposes of a civil claim.  
 
                                                          
30 1988 SLT 361. 
31 At 367.  
32 At 367. In fact he relied on an English case, Lindley v Rutter [1981] 1 QB 128 (inappropriate strip search regarded 
as an “affront to the dignity and privacy of the individual”, at 135), now to be read in the light of Wainwright v Home 
Office [2004] 2 AC 406. 
33 At 367. 
34 2002 Rep LR 137; aff’d 2003 SC 317. 
35 At para 8. 
36 For discussion see E Reid, “The Sheriff in the Heather”, in J P Grant and E Sutherland (eds), Pronounced for Doom  
(2013) 161 at 175. 
37 Para 31. 
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Although they do not provide a secure basis for doing so, Henderson and McKie point therefore in 
the direction of recognising infringements of the privacy in this sense as delicts against the 
person.  
 
And on a wider view, the Scots framework is not limited to the extent that the pigeon-
hole system of discrete nominate torts constrains the development of English law.  The law of 
delict has a more flexible structure, in which specific categories of delictual liability are 
underpinned by general principle. As Lord Hope characterised cross-border difference: 38 
 
With us, of course, delict is a part of the law of obligations. It is a broad concept, embracing all 
civil claims for reparation which lie outside the area of contract. In England the law of torts has 
grown up by the use of precedent. Lawyers accustomed to relying upon precedent are troubled 
when they come across something new. The creation of a new tort is a bold, some would say an 
irresponsible, exercise – not to be undertaken lightly. To embrace something new within the 
concept of delict is so much easier. 
 
As noted above there is persuasive authority for acknowledging privacy of the person as 
deserving of protection. It seems that in England the future availability of a remedy for 
intrusions of the type experienced by Ms Beyts will depend upon finding an appropriate “peg” 
on which to hang it. For the Scots, on the other hand, the primary concern is not the remedy but 
the right. As Lord Dunedin succinctly reflected: “You may not get what you want, but that will 
be because you failed to show that you had the right to get it”.39 Did the pursuer suffer relevant 
harm as a consequence of the defender infringing a protected interest? In circumstances where 
the defender has flouted the pursuer’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”,40 as alleged to have 
occurred here, that question deserves to be asked. 
 
Elspeth Reid 
University of Edinburgh 
                                                          
38 “The strange habits of the English”, in H L MacQueen (ed), Miscellany VI (Stair Society vol 54, 2009) 308 at 317.  
39 “The divergencies and convergencies of English and Scottish law” (Fifth lecture on the David Murray Foundation 
in the University of Glasgow, 21 May 1935); see also Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1986 SLT 193 per Lord 
Ross at 198. 
40 Acknowledged by the sheriff at para 13. 
